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.Rescission of Contrac-utual Ignorance of Facts-7l'he Ground
for Rescission in Equity.
Where the holder of a policy of insurance upon the life of a third
-party for $6000, finding the payment of premiums burdensome, agrees with
.the insurance company to exchange this policy for a paid-up policy for
S25o, upon the presumption that the third party was still living, and the
-party upon whose life the policy has been issued was, unknown to the
'holder of the policy and the company, actually dead at the.time of such
-exchange of policies, a Court of Equity will decree that the contract of
-exchange be rescinded and the original policy be reinstated.
PAXSON, C. J., and MiTmHELL, J., dissenting.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Bill in equity to rescind a contract of exchange of life
insurance policies and to reinstate a policy on the life of
one I1 eisenring for $6ooo. The bill as amended averred
that the plaintiff had surrendered to the defendant com-
,pany a life insurance policy for $6ooo on the life of one
Leisenring, and received in return a paid-up policy for
.$25oo. That she had done this because the premiums on
the $6ooo policy were burdensome, and because no infor-
imation could be had whether the said Leisenring were
-alive or dead. That both parties to the exchange acted on
the basis that the said Leisenring was then alive. The
.answer filed by the receiver of the company defendant
denied this allegation, averring that the express understand-
ing was that the transaction was not to be affected by the
fact that Leisenring should be discovered thereafter to be
alive or dead. The only evidence on this point was the
I Reported 31 W. N. C., 533; see also 140 Pa., 201.
IGNORANCE OF FACT AS GROUND
testimony of the plaintiff and her agent who dealt with the
company defendant. They both swore that they dealt
upon the understanding that Leisenring was living at the
time. Neither party knew of the termination of the life,
until after the transaction was completed.
* The reasoning upon .which the Court reached its.
decision is set forth in the following extract from the
opinion by STERRETT, j.:
OPINION OF THE COURT.
"The general rule is that an act done or contract
made under mistake of a materIlal fact is voidable or re-
lievable in equity. . . Thus A buys from B an estate-
to which the latter is supposed to have an unquestionable-
title. It turns out, upon due investigation of the facts.
unknown at the time to both parties, that B has no title
(as if there be a nearer heir than B who was supposed to
be dead but is in fact living), in such a case equity will
relieve the purchaser and rescind the contract. MR.
POLLOCK, in his excellent treatise on the Principles of Con-
tract, 441, states the general p-inciple thus: 'An agree-
.ment is void if it relates to a subject-matter (whether a
material subject of ownership or a particular title or right),
contemplated by the parties as existing but which in fact
did not exist. . . It cannot be doubted that in exchang-
ing the old for the new policy both parties acted on the.
basis that Leisenring was then alive.'"
IGNORANCE OF FACT AS GROUND FOR R.USCISSION OF CONTRA&S.
In commenting on this case it is assumed that the fact was correctly-
decided. . It is not proposed to inquire into that, but to assume as estab-
lished by the evidence that both parties dealt with each other on the basis.
that the insured was living at the time of making the contract of exchange-
In what way this was arrived at from the evidence under the pleadings
may be a subject of interesting speculation, and was, probably, the ground
of a dissent by two judges. Having arrived at this finding of fact, the-
decision followed as a logical consequence.
The rule invokcd by the Court for The extinction of the. obligation
its decision is identical with, if not orcontract by the extinction of the-
derived from, that of the Roman - thing due was a well, defined rule.
law, which was founded on the of the Roman law. If. a man owe
broadest equity and justice. to another a flock of sheep and they-
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die the man is not bound by his
contract to deliver them, or if some
of the flock die he stands excused
as to those dead. I. Pothier on
Obligations (Evans), 384.
This rule was adopted even by
the English Common law; so
that a man sued on a contract to
return a horse was held to have
made a good plea in setting forth
that the horse had died and, there-
fore, he was unable to perform his
contract. William v. Hide Pal-
mner, 548 (Trin 4, Car. B. R.)
Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. Williams,
217, is an illustration of its enforce-
ment in equity. In that case the
Chancellor granted a perpetual in-
junction against the enforcement
at law of a judgment on articles of
agreement for the purchase of
shares in the Lustring Company
which were never issued, the com-
pany and all similar companies
having been prohibited by act of
Parliament. The Court, referring to
the rule, remarked that the seller,
Bailis, had sold moonshine.
Usually the rule is referred in
equity to the well-recognized head
of mistake. For most practical
purposes this is unobjectionable.
And yet it may be as well to at
least remark a distinction logical
and real, although possibly not easy
of application to cases that may
arise.
Where parties intend to put their
contract in certain terms, and by
mistake omit some terms, or put in
different terms, or where they con-
tract, supposing certain things to
exist which do not exist, there
occurs a true and proper i fstake.
But where parties make a contract
complete in its termis, precisely as
they intended, and having no un-
derstanding or opinion about the
condition of affairs or the thing
which by chance afterward turns
out of great importance, it is
scarcely accurate to refer the prob-
lem that then arises to the head of
mistake. They have made no mis-
take, for that implies an opinion,
and as likely as not they have had
no opinion whatever. The prob-
lem is really one of interpretation
of their contract,, of ascertaining
what, in a legal sense, the parties
must be presumed to have intended
regarding something about which,
as a matter of fact, they simply had
no intention at all, never having
given it the slightest consideration.
They may have been ignorant of it;
may not have had any intention re-
garding it, or their intentions may
have been so widely different as to
be incapable of meeting in a con-
tract.
It is not strictly accurate to desig-
nate as the result of mistake some
unexpected turn of events that
makes important this unmentioned
thing, which their contract did not
regard and was not intended to con-
template, and as to which it was
ignorantly or intentionally silent.
See i Story's Equity Jurispru-
dence, 14o. (Note.)
The real difficulty involved in
cases of this sort is of quite a differ-
ent character. It is not a question
of whether there has been a mutual
mistake, but what was the legal
intention of the parties regarding
the matter as to which their con-
tract is silent. It is the question
of the legal interpretation of their
contract. Take for example the
simplest case: One party contracts
to sell his house to the other, and
the house is burned at the time of
the contract and unknown to both.
The contract is void according to
the rule, and the reason that it is
void is that in every contract of sale
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the parties are presumed, as a matter
-of law, to have contemplated the
existence of the thing sold and to
have made that existence a term of
their contract. Pollock's Principles
of Contract, 44'.
The rule is thus put in its true
light not as part of the equitable
doctrine of mistake, but as a rule
,of interpretation of contracts.
The rule has been greatly broad-
ened and made more comprehensive
in the English law, so that logically
and properly stated the Roman
rule has become only a corollary
to the general proposition, which
may be stated somewhat in this
form:
Whenever the contract is silent
as'to some thing or condition of
things, and there is no positive evi-
dence what the parties intended
about it; if from all the circum-
stances of the parties, of the con-
tract, of the subject-matter, it can
be inferred that the parties must
have contemplated such thing or
condition of things as essential to
their contract, then the non-exist-
ence of that thing or condition of
things will avoid or rescind the
contract.
It is a presumption of law that
the parties contemplated the subject-
matter of the contract as an essen-
tial, and its non-existence will
always avoid or rescind the con-
tract. Pollock on Contracts, 441.
Treating the rule, therefore, as a
principle of interpretation of con-
tracts, the cases easily divide them-
selves into:
(i) Where the subject-matter of
the contract isnon-existent. Hitch-
-cock v. Giddings, 4 Price, 135, was
the case of a bond given in 18io for
the purchase of a remainder expect-
anton afee tail. Unknown to either
vendor or purchaser, the remainder
had been defeated by a recovery in
i8o8 and therefore had no existence
at the time of the making of the
bond. On this ground the bond
was cancelled.
In like manner sale of a life
annuity was held void, the life hav-
ing dropped at the time of the sale
unknown to both parties. Strick-
land v. Turner, 7 -x., 2o8. So the
purchase of shares of a company
which is being wound up unknown
to both parties will be held void:
In re London, Hamburg & Conti-
nenfal Bank, i Ch. App. Cases, 433.
A contract to take bank shares
created under a plan of amalgama-
tion of two banks, which amalgama-
tion was afterward declared illegal,
was avoided forsame reason: Bank
of Hindostan v. Alison, I.R., 6 C.
P., 54.
A contract for a cargo of corn
shipped by A from Salonica to
London was held void, the cargo
at the time of the contract having
been actually sold at Tunis on ac-
count of accidental damage suffered
by it during the voyage. Neither
party knew this fact until after the
making of the contract: Couturier
v. Hastie, 5 H. L. C., 673.
The same rule is applied to exec-
utory contracts which may be
referred to here as shedding light
on the reason of the rule.-
Where a man buys 2oo tons of
potatoes to be raised on a particular
farm and by reason of blight the
crop fails so as to produce only
8o tons, the seller is excused from
further performance of the contract,
although it would seem that for
the amount actually produced the
contract might be valid: Howell
v. Coupland, L. R., 9 Q. B., 462.
Criticized in Anderson v. May, 52
Northwest. Rep., 530.
Where a man sold cotton in
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specified bales designated by par-
ticular marks, and after a delivery
of part the remainder was burned,
the. same doctrine was applied:
Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y., 62.
Where a man rented a music hall
and it was destroyed by fire after the
contract but before performance by
the use of the hall the contract was
held void: Tyler v. Caldwell, 3 B.
& S., 826. BLACKBURN, J., laying
down as the principle of the deci-
sion that where the performance of
a contract depends on the continued
existence of a thing a condition is
implied that impossibility of per-
formance by reason of the perishing
of the thing excuses performance.
In other words, there is no contract;
neither party is bound, and there-
fore it is to be presumed that money
or any other valuable thing already
paid by either party might be re-
covered in an action for money had
and received.
So in Spalding et at. v. Rosa et
al., 71 N. Y., 4o, a contract of the
Wachtel Opera Company to per-
form operas was held void by reason
of the illness of Herr Wachtel, the
Court remarking that in all con-
tracts for personal service the im-
plied condition is always that the
person shall be able at the time to
perform them.
In Appleby v. Myers, L. R., 2 C.
P., 651, a contract to erect ma-
chinery and keep it in repair for
two years in a mill was held void by
reason of the destruction of the mill
by fire, and that no action would
lie for the work already done, the
contract being an entire one and
not fully completed when avoided
by the fire. Both parties wire held
absolved from further performance.
(2) Where something other than
the subject-matter of the contract is
non-existent.
The cases already cited present
no great difficulty, and they are
given chiefly to show that the rule
is one of interpretation of the legal
meaning of the contract and as evi-
dence of how closely the rule of the
Roman law has been followed. In
the following cases there appears the
difficulty of the rule in its applica-
tion to matters other than the exist-
ence of the subject-matter of the
contract.
The Courts seem to have adopted
in a general way the principle
already laid down, that the non-ex-
istence of anything which the partie.
contemplated as essential to their
agreement will avoid the agree-
ment. Of course the ascertaining
by the Court of whether any par-
ticular thing was contemplated by
the parties as essential has been a
matter of much difficulty. De-
prived of the guidance of the legal
presumption which made the exist-
ence of the subject-matter an essen-
tial of the contract, they have been
perforce compelled to examine the
circumstances, the parties and all
the res geste, so to speak, of the
contract, in order to ascertain what
other things were contemplated in
a legal sense by the parties as exist-
ing and essential to their contract.
The decisions have been as various.
as the circumitances of the con-
tracts.
In March v. Pigott, 3 Burr, 2802,
two sons contracted to pay each to.
the other a certain sun upon the
death of their respective fathers.
At the time of the contract the
father of one, unknown to either
party, had died. The Court held
the contract or wager was binding
because that was what the parties
meant to do, to make a wager on
the lives of their fathers in order
that lie who should first come to his-
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inheritance might aid the other
who had not, and who would stand
in need of the money. Observe the
reasoning of the Court is entirely
devoted to ascertaining what the
parties intended.
In Bell v. Gardiner, 4 Man and
G., I I, the defendant was relieved
from payment of a note given for a
bill of exchange upon which he was
endorser, but which had. been
altered without his consent. He
had no knowledge of the altera-
tion at the time of giving the
note.
In Bradford v. Symondson, 7 Q- B.
Div., 456, a contract of re-insurance
was made by the Phcenix Insurance
Company upon a vessel insured by.
the company and over dpie, but
which at the time of the contract,
and unknown to both parties, was
safe in port. The contract was
held binding, and a suit for the
premium was sustained.
In Ketchum v. Catlin, 21 Vermont,
191, the contract was for the sale
of certain country produce, each
party supposing. that it was. in a
warehouse at Whitehall; in fact, it
was in Boston, whither it had been
sent and sold for the account of the
seller. Held, that the sius of the
property. was a material fact and
that the contract was void, that
fact having been different from
what had been supposed, and the
purchaser was allowed to recover
back the money he had paid on
account.
In Gibson "v. Pelkie, 37 Mich.,
379, there was a contract concern-
ing a judgment which appeared not
to be a valid judgment, and the con-
tract was held void.
In Allen v. Hammond, ii Peters,
63, the contract was to pay a com-
mission for procuring from the.
Portuguese government an allow-
ance of a certain claim against it.
The claim had been allowed at the
time of the contract, although
neither party was aware of it. The
Court rescinded the contract.
In Walker v. Tucker, 70 IMI.,
527, in defense to an action for
rent of a coal mine, it was pleaded
that the coal was so exhausted that
it could not be profitably mined.
The Court held the plea bad, re-
marking that in the lease the exist-
ence of coal in profitable quantities
had not been made an express con-
dition or basis of contract, although
doubtless assumed by both parties.
Had the plea set- up that the coal
was exhaused, that might have
been a good defense.
Muhlenberg-v..Henning, 1I6 Pa.,
138, was a like case involving iron
ore. Fritzler v. Robinson, 7o Iowa,
Soo, was a like case involving coal.
The reasoning of the Court in all
the cases was directed to ascertain-
ing what the contract meant, find-
ing there the chief and only diffi-
culty of the case.
Fleetweed v. Brown, io9 Ind.,
567, was case of suit on a note
given for a quit claim deed of all
the payee's interest in the real estate
of" his father, who had been absent
for many years. The defense was
that the father had since returned
and sold the land, and it was held
that the note was void. Here the
basis of the contract was that the
third party, the father, was dead,
just the reverse of that assumed in
the principal case, that the insured
was alive.
Where the contract was for a
patent, and the patent was found
invalid, the contract was held void;
GIBSON, C. J., remarking that the
party intended to buy the patent
under the notion that it was valid.
Bellas v. Hays, 5 S. & R., 427. To
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:he same effect is Geiger v. Cook,
3W. & S., 266, where the plaintiff
was not allowed to recover for a
note given for a patent which was
invalid although the deed for the
patent had been delivered in con-
sideration of the making of the
note, and the title to the patent,
such as it was, had become the
property of the maker.
In Sears v. Leland, 145 Mass.,
277, the plaintiff purchased a mort-
gage which was invalid, although
neither purchaser nor seller was
aware of it at the time of the sale.
The plaintiff sought to avoid the
contract on the ground of the in-
validity of the mortgage. But the
Court held that the rule had no
application to the facts of the case.
"Where the subject of contract has
no existence, as where two parties
contract ad to the sale of a horse
which'without the .knowledge of
either is dead, the contract may
indeed be rescinded. But this prin-
ciple has no application where one
voluntarily purchases such right,
title or interest as may exist."
There was no express warranty of
the mortgage, and the plaintiff got--
an assignment of all the defend-
ant's title. In other words, the
Court concluded that, looking at all
the circumstances of the case, the
parties- could not be legally pre-
sumed to have made the validity of
the mortgage an essential term of
their agreement.
It is not easy to reconcile this
,lecision with the preceding upon
the validity of a patent.
In Irwin v. Wilson, 15 North-
east Rep., 209, a contract of ex-
change of lands was rescinded, a
certain value having been fixed
upon one of the parcels of land by
a third party, neither of the con-
tracting parties having any knowl-
edge of the value, and the valuation
afterward having been discovered
to be erroneous.
In Crist v. Dicey, 18 Ohio, 536,
an exchange of farms was made,
one farm having never been in-
spected by either party. A letter
of a third person was shown which
gave a favorable description of the
unknown farm, but the owner re,
fused to guarantee the truth of the
letter. The farm was, in fact unfit
for cultivation, and the owner knew
that the other party intended to
occupy it for that purpose. The
Court refused to-rescind the contract
of exchange.
In Griffith v. Sebastian County,
49 Ark., 24, a deed for $I.oo was
made to the county for certain town
lots, the grantor supposing that the
county seat had been moved to the
town and that the lots would be
used for a court-house, and his other
lots would be thus increased in
value. Afterward the proceedings
for the removal of the county seat
were held void and illegal, and the
deed was rescinded at the suit of the
grantor.
--- With such a collection of cases it
is not easy to even attempt an
answer to the question of the prac-
titioner; how in such a contract is it
to be known what are contemplated
by the parties as essential terms of
their contract. On this point Chief
Justice GinsoN has said that the
thing must be such as "entered
into the contemplation of both
parties as a condition of their assent.
If it related to a thing which was
but a collateral matter to the ulti-
mate object or motive of the one
party, it will not prejudice the
other, who was not influenced by
it. On any other principle no one
could be held to a bargain induced
by a mistaken expectatioif of gain :"
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